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Abstract
Professor Van Horn [International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 34 (2003) 3]
has reviewed much of the work that followed Richard Coxs publication of his axioms for
probability in 1946. My comments will emphasize work that came earlier and also merits
attention. In particular, I will discuss work by Sergei Bernstein that is closely related to
Coxs but has been neglected by Cox and his commentators.
Before reviewing Bernsteins work, I will discuss the context of Coxs work and ex-
plain why it did not dissuade me from studying alternative representations of uncer-
tainty. After discussing Bernstein, I will make just one comment on Van Horns
presentation.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Richard Cox and his times
Richard Threlkeld Cox (1898–1991) received a doctoral degree in physics
from Johns Hopkins University in 1924. He then taught at New York Uni-
versity until 1943, when he returned to Johns Hopkins. In addition to teaching
physics there, he served as dean of the college of arts and sciences for seven
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years. He worked in several areas of physics, including statistical mechanics
and the scattering of electrons.
Though he was not a specialist in pure probability theory, Cox published an
article on the axiomatization of probability, ‘‘Probability, Frequency, and
Reasonable Expectation’’ [4], in the American Journal of Physics, a well-
respected journal that specializes in pedagogical and expository articles. In
1961, he expanded the article to a small book [5]. It is the article that is usually
cited when Coxs axioms are discussed.
Cox situated his work on the axiomatization of probability in the context of
debates about the meaning of probability that had been conducted in English
in the preceding decades. Everyone who wrote about the interpretation of
probability, Cox observed, had a diﬀerent opinion, but the clearest line of
division was between those who interpreted probabilities as frequencies in an
ensemble and those who interpreted probabilities as degrees of reasonable
expectation. Cox enlisted on the side of reasonable expectation, and he pro-
posed axioms for reasonable expectation that imply the usual rules of the
probability calculus. He did not claim to be the ﬁrst to do this; he cited Keynes
[10] and Jeﬀreys and Wrinch [9,22] as predecessors. But he felt that the axioms
advanced by these predecessors showed ‘‘some of the tool marks of their
original derivation from the study of games of chance, with the consequent
implication of an ensemble’’ [4, p. 5]. His own axioms, he felt, escaped from
this residual frequentism.
Coxs perspective on previous work on the interpretation of probability was
rather narrow. This appears to have been due, at least in part, to the inﬂuence
of Keynes. We ﬁnd this statement in the preface of Coxs 1961 book:
I have tried to indicate my obligations to other writers in the notes at the
end of the book. Even without any such indication, readers familiar with A
Treatise on Probability by the late J.M. Keynes would have no trouble in
seeing howmuch I am indebted to that work. It must have been thirty years
or so ago that I ﬁrst read it, for it was almost my earliest reading in the the-
ory of probability, but nothing on the subject that I have read since has
given me more enjoyment or made a stronger impression on my mind.
Although Keynes had included many continental authors in the bibliogra-
phy to his book, he emphasized his English predecessors, and because of the
early date of his work, 1 he did not take into account the vigorous debate on
1 A Treatise on Probability was published in 1921 but appears to have been based on research
done much earlier. In his preface, Keynes writes ‘‘I propound my systematic conception of this
subject for criticism and enlargement at the hands of others, doubtful whether I myself am likely to
get much further, by waiting longer, with a work, which, beginning as a Fellowship Dissertation,
and interrupted by the war, has already extended over many years.
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the foundations of probability that took place in French, German, Italian, and
Russian during the ﬁrst third of the 20th century [20], the fruits of which in-
cluded Andrei Kolmogorovs axiomatization of mathematical probability [11],
Jean Villes introduction of martingales [21], and Bruno de Finettis perso-
nalistic formulation of subjective probability [6]. Cox followed Keynes in
emphasizing English predecessors and ignoring the 20th-century continental
debate. In 1946 and again in 1961, Cox does not mention fellow subjectivists
such as Henri Poincare, Emile Borel, or Bruno de Finetti. And he does not
discuss the work of Sergei Bernstein. Bernstein had been listed in Keyness
bibliography, and Cox lists him in the bibliography of his 1961 book, but with
no comment.
As we can see from Van Horns bibliography, this narrowness of perspective
has been perpetuated in subsequent discussion of Coxs work. I hope that my
contribution here will encourage future commentators to place Cox in a richer
historical perspective.
2. Why Cox did not dissuade me
When Cox wrote, there was little interest in alternatives to the standard
probability calculus for the representation of evidence or belief, and so it is not
clear whether Cox would have seen his axioms as excluding such alternatives.
In agreement with Keynes, he wrote that ‘‘it is hardly to be supposed that every
reasonable expectation should have a precise numerical value’’ [4, p. 9], and so
he might well have conceded some role to representations that use a pair of
numbers to represent the evidence for a proposition, one representing the de-
gree of belief in the proposition justiﬁed by the evidence, and another, possi-
bility larger in magnitude, representing the degree to which the proposition
remains plausible in light of the evidence. In recent decades, however, Coxs
axioms have been used to argue against such representations. Coxs axioms are
axiomatic, it is argued, and so only the standard probability calculus should be
used to represent evidence.
Most of my own scholarly work has been devoted to representations of
uncertainty that depart from the standard probability calculus, beginning with
my work on belief functions in the 1970s and 1980s and continuing with my
work on causality in the 1990s [18] and my current work with Vladimir Vovk
on game-theoretic probability ([19], www.probabilityandﬁnance.com). I un-
dertook all of this work after a careful reading, as a graduate student in the
early 1970s, of Coxs paper and book. His axioms did not dissuade me.
As Van Horn notes, with a quote from my 1976 book [17], I am not on
board even with Coxs implicit assumption that reasonable expectation can
normally be expressed as a single number. I should add that I am also un-
persuaded by Coxs two explicit axioms. Here they are in Coxs own notation:
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1. The likelihood  bja is determined in some way by the likelihood bja:
 bja ¼ SðbjaÞ;
where S is some function of one variable.
2. The likelihood c  bja is determined in some way by the two likelihoods bja
and cjb  a:
c  bja ¼ F ðcjb  a; bjaÞ;
where F is some function of two variables.
I have never been able to appreciate the normative claims made for these
axioms. They are abstractions from the usual rules of the probability calculus,
which I do understand. But when I try to isolate them from that calculus and
persuade myself that they are self-evident in their own terms, I draw a blank.
They are too abstract––too distant from speciﬁc problems or procedures––to
be self-evident to my mind.
It may be useful, in this connection, to quote Coxs own argument for
c  bja ¼ F ðcjb  a; bjaÞ:
Written in symbolic form, this assumption may not appear very axiom-
atic. Actually it is a familiar enough rule of common sense, as an example
will show. Let b denote the proposition that an athlete can run from one
given place to another, and let c denote the proposition that he can run
back without stopping. The physical condition of the runner and the to-
pography of the course are described in the hypothesis a. Then bja is the
likelihood that he can run to the distant place, estimated on the informa-
tion given in a, and cjb  a is the likelihood that he can run back, esti-
mated on the initial information and the further assumption that he
has just run one way. These are just the likelihoods that would have to
be considered in estimating the likelihood, c  bja, that he can run the
complete course without stopping. In postulating only that the last-
named likelihood is some function of the other two, we are making the
least restrictive assumption [4, p. 6].
It surely does make sense to decompose problems of probability judgement
into subproblems. The function F puts back together the judgements we make
in the subproblems. But why should we always use the same function F to put
subproblems back together? Might we not use a diﬀerent F if we decompose
the problem diﬀerently, say by considering ﬁrst the adequacy of the runners
muscles and then the adequacy of his heart and lungs? Might we not use a
diﬀerent F in an entirely diﬀerent problem? The only argument I see for trying
always to use the same F is the example provided by the probability calculus.
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Perhaps it is not out of place to recall just what is at issue when we ask,
along with Cox, whether his two assumptions are ‘‘axiomatic’’. This word is
used rather freely nowadays. When I wear a pure mathematicians hat, my
calling something an axiom means only that I want to explore its logical
consequences. But when Cox asks whether his assumptions are axiomatic, he is
evoking on older sense of the word––the sense used by Euclid, who called an
entirely self-evident assumption (things which equal the same thing also equal
one another) an axiom, while calling a more debatable assumption (parallel
lines never meet) a postulate. Although Van Horns tone is sympathetic to Cox,
his ﬁnal conclusion, that he cannot make a compelling case for Coxs as-
sumptions, contradicts Coxs claim that these assumptions are axiomatic.
Extended debate of this point seems futile, however. Some people are per-
suaded by Coxs argument. Some are not. We must leave the matter there.
3. The earlier work of Sergei Bernstein
It may be more productive to call attention to the axioms for probability
published in Russian in 1917 [1] by Sergei Natanovich Bernstein (1880–1968).
Bernstein received his doctoral degree in analysis in Paris in 1904, and he is
known for his work in various areas of analysis, including elliptic diﬀerential
equations, approximation theory, and the theory of analytic functions. Within
probability theory, he is best known for his early work on the central limit
theorem for dependent random variables. He began to publish work in prob-
ability only around 1917, long after his studies in France, but his philosophical
views on probability were very much in the tradition of French probabilists
such as Henri Poincare [16], Emile Borel [3], and Paul Levy [14]. Like all these
authors, and like Richard Cox after him, Bernstein believed that probability is
essentially subjective and becomes objective only when there is suﬃcient con-
sensus or adequate evidence.
There is an important diﬀerence, however, between Bernstein and the
French probabilists on the one hand and Cox on the other. Cox wanted to
divorce his subjective conception of probability from the origins of probability
theory in games of chance, which he believed was tied to the concept of fre-
quency. Bernstein and the French probabilists, on the other hand, based their
subjective conception of probability squarely on the traditional concept of
equally likely cases, which was the classical foundation for probability.
According to the classical foundation, ﬁrst formulated by Abraham De
Moivre in The Doctrine of Chances in 1718 [7], the probability of an event is the
ratio of the number of equally likely cases that favor it to the total number of
equally likely cases possible under the circumstances. From this deﬁnition, one
derives the rules of probability as theorems. The theorem of total probability
says that if A and B cannot both happen,
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probability of A or B happening
¼ # of cases favoring A or B
total # of cases
¼ # of cases favoring A
total # of cases
þ # of cases favoring B
total # of cases
¼ ðprobability of AÞ þ ðprobability of BÞ:
The theorem of compound probability says
probability of both A and B happening
¼ # of cases favoring both A and B
total # of cases
¼ # of cases favoring A
total # of cases
 # of cases favoring both A and B
# of cases favoring A
¼ ðprobability of AÞ  ðprobability of B if A happensÞ:
These arguments, often associated with the name of Laplace, were still stan-
dard fare in the probability textbooks of the early 20th century, including those
by Henri Poincare [16] and Andrei Markov [15].
In his 1917 article, ‘‘On the axiomatic foundation of the theory of proba-
bility’’, Bernstein accepted equally likely cases as the starting point. But instead
of arbitrarily deﬁning numerical probability as the number of favorable cases
to the total number of cases, he derived this deﬁnition from qualitative axioms.
Here are his two most important axioms:
• If A and A1 are equally likely, B and B1 are equally likely, A and B are incom-
patible, and A1 and B1 are incompatible, then (A or B) and (A1 or B1) are
equally likely.
• If A occurs, the new probability of a particular occurrence a of A is a func-
tion of the initial probabilities of a and A.
The ﬁrst of these axioms can be thought of as a qualitative statement of the
theorem of total probability, the second as a qualitative statement of the
theorem of compound probability. Using the ﬁrst axiom, Bernstein deduced
that if A is the conjunction of m out of n equally likely and incompatible
propositions, and B is as well, then A and B must be equally likely. It follows
that the numerical probability of A and B is some function of the ratio m=n, and
we may as well take that function to be the identity. Using the second axiom,
Bernstein then deduced that the new probability of a when A occurs is the ratio
of the initial probability of a to that of A.
The commonalities with Coxs work are striking. Coxs axioms are also
qualitative statements of the theorems of total and compound probability. Like
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Bernstein, Cox includes a dose of convention in his argument. Bernstein says
we might as well take our function of the ratio m=n to be the identity. Cox
deduces that his function F must have the form
F ðx; yÞ ¼ Cf ðxÞf ðyÞ;
where C is a constant and f is an arbitrary function of a single variable, and he
then says we might as well take f to be the identity and C to equal one. There
are also important diﬀerences. For example, Bernsteins counterpart of the rule
of compound probability says that the probability of one event given another is
a function of unconditional probabilities, while Cox goes in the more tradi-
tional direction, saying that the joint probability is a function of the probability
of the ﬁrst event and the probability of the second given the ﬁrst.
The most important diﬀerence between the two authors is their attitude
towards the concept of equally likely cases. Bernstein accepted this concept as
his starting point. Keynes also retained a version of the concept, his ‘‘principle
of indiﬀerence’’. This is what Cox saw as a the residual frequentism in Keyness
thinking, which he claimed to eliminate. It is precisely this elimination that
makes Coxs reasoning unpersuasive for me. I see the probability calculus as a
special, not universal, framework for uncertain reasoning, and the concept of
equally likely cases provides one way of seeing what is special about it.
Like Cox, Bernstein axiomatized the ﬁeld of propositions as well as the
concept of numerical probability. He also extended his theory to the case where
this ﬁeld is inﬁnite. He repeated the exposition of his axioms again in a
probability textbook that he published in 1927 [2], but neither the article nor
the book were ever translated out of Russian into other languages. The neglect
of his work is primarily due, no doubt, to its linguistic inaccessibility. His work
deserves recognition, however, and I would like to see it taken into account in
future discussions of Coxs work. This would enlarge both the historical and
the philosophical context of these discussions.
4. Conclusion
Cox believed that the classical understanding of probability in terms of
equally likely cases was hopelessly infected with frequentism. In my judgement,
this belief was historically myopic. True, the frequentists of the mid-20th
century had laid claim to games of chance. But Poincare, Borel, and Bernstein
had acknowledged the centrality of games of chance and equally likely cases
without adopting frequentism.
I believe that the classical understanding of the probability calculus retains
great value even today. Mathematical probability grew out of games of chance,
and game-theoretic concepts remain at its core. As Vovk and I have shown
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[19], these game-theoretic concepts can be generalized very substantially. But
there remain contexts where game theory may not provide the most useful way
of assessing evidence and belief.
In this spirit of inclusiveness and tolerance, I would like to suggest that Van
Horn and other commentators on Cox reconsider one aspect of their exposi-
tion: their use of the word ‘‘plausibility’’. They need a synonym for ‘‘proba-
bility’’ that does not presuppose the rules they set out to derive. Cox himself, as
we have noted, used ‘‘likelihood’’ in this role. This choice is more problematic
today, because so many readers will interpret ‘‘likelihood’’ in the sense of
Fisher [8]. So Van Horn and others use ‘‘plausibility’’. This choice conﬂicts
with the way I and others have used ‘‘plausibility’’ in the theory of belief
functions [17], for in that theory both a proposition and its negation may be
plausible. As it happens, we have the dictionary on our side. In English,
plausibility, even of the greatest degree, is merely an appearance of truth, which
we recognize may be deceptive. When participants in a debate appropriate the
other sides terms of discourse in a way that contradicts the dictionary, the
coherence and civility of the debate is imperiled. So I suggest they use some
other term. How about ‘‘likeliness’’?
References
[1] Sergei N. Bernstein, Og]In arcbovanbxecrouo o,ocyodaybz neopbb depOznyocneq (On the
axiomatic foundation of the theory of probability), Coo,oeybzXap]rodcrouo vanevanbxecrouo
o,oecnda (Communications of the Kharkiv Mathematical Society) 15 (1917) 209–274.
[2] Sergei N. Bernstein, Teopbz depoznyocneq (Theory of Probability), Uocylapcndeyyoe
Bplanek]cndo, Moscow and Leningrad, 1927.
[3] Emile Borel, La valeur pratique du calcul des probabilites, Revue du Mois 1 (1906) 424–
437.
[4] Richard T. Cox, Probability, frequency, and reasonable expectation, American Journal of
Physics 14 (1946) 1–13.
[5] Richard T. Cox, The Algebra of Probable Inference, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1961.
[6] Bruno de Finetti, La prevision, ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives, Annales de lInstitut
Henri Poincare 7 (1937) 1–68, An English translation by Henry E. Kyburg Jr., is included in
both editions [12,13].
[7] Abraham De Moivre, The Doctrine of Chances, London, third ed., 1718, The ﬁrst edition
appeared in 1718, the second in 1738.
[8] Ronald A. Fisher, Statistical Methods and Scientiﬁc Inference, Hafner, London, 1956.
[9] Harold Jeﬀreys, Theory of Probability, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939.
[10] John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, Macmillan, London, 1921.
[11] Andrei N Kolmogorov, Grundbegriﬀe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, Springer, Berlin,
1933, An English translation by Nathan Morrison appeared under the title Foundations of the
Theory of Probability (Chelsea, New York) in 1950, with a second edition in 1956. A Russian
translation, by G.M. Bavli, appeared under the title OCHOBH]Ie gOHzTbz neopbb
depOznyocneq (Hayra, MOSCOW) in 1936, with a second edition, slightly expanded by
Kolmogorov with the assistance of Albert N. Shiryaev, in 1974.
104 G. Shafer / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 35 (2004) 97–105
[12] Henry E. Kyburg Jr., Howard E. Smokler, Studies in Subjective Probability, Wiley, New
York, 1964, This selection of readings ranges chronologically from John Venn in 1888 to
Leonard J. Savage in 1961.
[13] Henry E. Kyburg Jr., Howard E. Smokler, Studies in Subjective Probability, second ed.,
Krieger, New York, 1964, This selection of readings is slightly diﬀerent from that in the ﬁrst
edition.
[14] Paul Levy, Calcul de probabilites, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1925.
[15] Andrei Markov (1856–1922), BcxbckeHbe depoznyocneq (Calculus of Probability), Saint
Petersburg, Academy of Sciences, 1900, A second edition appeared in 1908, and a German
translation of the second edition appeared in 1912.
[16] Henri Poincare, Calcul des probabilites, second ed., Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1912, The ﬁrst
edition appeared in 1896.
[17] Glenn Shafer, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1976.
[18] Glenn Shafer, The Art of Causal Conjecture, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996.
[19] Glenn Shafer, Vladimir Vovk, Probability and Finance: Its Only a Game!, Wiley, New York,
2001.
[20] Glenn Shafer, Vladimir Vovk, The sources of Kolmgorovs Grundbegriﬀe, Working paper no.
5, Game-Theoretic Probability and Finance Project. Available from <www.probabilityand-
ﬁnance.com>.
[21] Jean Ville, (1910–1988), Etude critique de la notion de collectif, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1939.
[22] Dorothy Wrinch, Harold Jeﬀreys, Philosophical Magazine, sixth series, 38, 1919.
G. Shafer / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 35 (2004) 97–105 105
